

<i>Assessment Scope Requirement</i>		<i>Evaluation - Reference to the Report</i>
Requirements of the Slovak Republic		
2.2.1.	To evaluate, in detail, the variants of the proposed change of activity in terms of selection of an optimum variant; in creating a set of criteria and determining their importance, to prefer the environmental impacts, impacts on human health and radiation safety.	The evaluation of the variants is mentioned in Part C, Chap. V, and the set of criteria for the selection of an optimum variant contains all the required criteria.
2.2.2.	To list the strategic documents, to which the proposed activity conforms in terms of the Atomic Act and to supplement the summary of the strategic documents.	<p>The strategic documents are listed in Chap. C II.19. and B II.8 of the Assessment Report. In terms of the Atomic Act, the following documents relate to the proposed activity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Strategy of Back-End of Nuclear Energy Peaceful Use in the Slovak Republic" approved by Government Resolution No. 26/2014 dated 15 January 2014 • "National Report of the Slovak Republic compiled in accordance with the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management“, August 2014 <p>"Domestic policy of spent fuel and radioactive waste management in the Slovak Republic“, "Domestic programme of spent fuel and radioactive waste management in the Slovak Republic“ are today under assessment of strategic document alteration. Both documents are in compliance with the "Strategy of Back-End of Nuclear Energy Peaceful Use in the Slovak Republic".</p>
2.2.3.	To include a comparison of the existing activity on site and of the	It is included in Annex No. 4 to the Assessment Report.

	new proposed technological solutions within the framework of the activity change with the latest trends of SF storage technological solutions in the world (selection of structural materials, selection of storage technology, provision of SF subcriticality, electric energy supplies (existence of backup sources), maintenance, monitoring systems etc.).	
2.2.4.	To specify whether within the framework of the proposed change of activity at Jaslovské Bohunice, SF storage from the nuclear units of the Mochovce power plant is also considered because at present, the proposed new activity " <i>Spent fuel storage facility Mochovce</i> " is also under environmental impact assessment. To clarify the expected balance of SF produced and to justify the required capacity of the proposed interim spent fuel storage facility or even to include the logistics of SF division between the two storage facilities if they are executed.	This fact is mentioned in Chap. II.2 (Purpose), II.6 (The Reason for Siting at the Proposed Site) and C III.16.1 (Impacts on Transport). The proposed expansion of the storage capacity allows for SF storage from all NPPs currently in operation (two units of the V2 NPP, two units of the EMO NPP) and also for SF from the completed EMO NPP Units 3 and 4. The expected balance of SF production from the nuclear power plants V1, V2, EMO 1,2, MO 3,4 is included in Chapter 7.2 "Spent fuel management strategy" of the document "Strategy of Back-End of Nuclear Energy Peaceful Use in the Slovak Republic" approved by Government Resolution No. 26/2014. The proposed expansion of interim SF storage capacity at J. Bohunice is based on the expected production included in the approved strategy. Taking into account the conditions specified in Act No. 541/2004 Coll., the company JAVYS, a.s. does not expect the operation of a spent fuel storage facility at Mochovce proposed by Slovenské elektrárne, a.s..
2.2.5.	To assess the suitability of placing the planned quantity of SF in one place in terms of safety and environmental impacts during normal operation as well as in non-standard situations.	It is included in part A, Chap. II.6 and in Chap. II.9 at the end of Zero Variant description.
2.2.6.	To propose a time schedule of expected construction commencement, storage facility construction duration, storage facility operation duration and decommissioning of both the existing and newly built nuclear installation. To describe the process of SF management along	It is included in Part A, Chapter II.7. The process of SF management is described in individual variants under assessment in Part A Chap. II.9, where individual steps of SF storage are described:

	with the expected permanent disposal.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SF storage near the reactor • SF storage in the wet storage facility • dry long-term storage • permanent disposal – the decision on the way of permanent disposal has not been made yet, the options are included in the strategic document currently under assessment "Draft domestic policy and domestic programme of SF and RAW management in the Slovak Republic" as an update of the strategic document "Strategy of Back-End of Nuclear Energy Peaceful Use in the Slovak Republic".
2.2.7.	To define how the handling and storage areas for spent fuel are protected against access of unauthorised people and unauthorised spent fuel handling or possible terrorism and also during possible external events such as earthquake, fire, storage facility flooding, human factor, etc.	<p>It is included in Part C in Chap. II.19 Operating Risks and their Possible Impact on the Territory.</p> <p>Additional information:</p> <p>Physical protection of the nuclear installation is provided in compliance with the legislation of the Slovak Republic. The way of protection is subject to Act No. 215/2004 Coll. on protection of classified information.</p> <p>Physical protection of nuclear installations and nuclear materials against theft, misuse and sabotage must be provided by the licence holder based on the requirements of Act No. 541/2004 Coll.</p> <p>By meeting the requirements of Regulation of the NRA SR No. 51/2006 Coll., the licence holder (JAVYS, a.s.) guarantees that based on the categorisation of nuclear materials, RAW, civil structures and technological equipment it has efficient physical protection. The main intention of the protection is to limit, to a maximum extent, the risk of abuse of nuclear installations and nuclear materials in order to jeopardise human lives and health and the environment.</p> <p>The system of physical protection is comprehensively described in the separate document "Plan of ISFS NI physical protection",</p>

		<p>which is part of classified documentation pursuant to Acts No. 215/2004 Coll. and No. 241/2001 Coll. The structure of ISFS is included in Category I pursuant to Regulation No. 51/2006 Coll. and based on this categorisation, the "Plan of ISFS NI physical protection" defines the respective level of physical protection, the way of execution and layout of the technical means of physical protection, requirements for technical means of physical protection during emergency events and regime measures related to ISFS protection. Entry to the ISFS structure is controlled and secured by mechanical-electronic systems. The entry permits are held by appointed workers with the authorisation.</p>
2.2.8.	To describe the ways of exposure and health risk evaluation results.	<p>It is included in Part B, Chap. II.5. and the assessment of impacts on the population is included in Part C, Chap.III.1 and it will be included in the particular safety documentation submitted to the Public Health Authority of the Slovak Republic in accordance with the valid legislation.</p> <p>The evaluation of expected radiation load on the personnel will be solved in the particular documentation submitted to the Public Health Authority of the Slovak Republic for siting and construction in accordance with Article 13 (5) (a) of the first item of Act on the National Council of the Slovak Republic No.355/2007 Coll., and the project will contain effective solutions of personnel protection against ionising radiation effects in order to observe the condition of optimisation in terms of radiation protection.</p>
2.2.9.	To include the elimination measures for the limitation of radioactive discharges and radioactive irradiation of employees and inhabitants during normal operation and possible operating events, in compliance with the philosophy of limitation of radiation doses.	<p>The proposed measures for elimination of undesirable effects of the proposed activity are included in Part C, Chap. IV and they will be solved in detail in the project documentation.</p>
2.2.10.	To include the procedures for operation safety control in the existing	<p>In accordance with the valid legislation, control procedures are planned for both the existing SF storage method and the SF</p>

	wet storage version and in the proposed variants.	storage method under preparation, they are included in Part C Chap. II.4 part Equipment Care Programmes (page 143) of the Assessment Report.
2.2.11.	To include the international experience and trends of SF storage technological solutions in the world.	It is included in Annex No. 4 to the Assessment Report.
2.2.12.	To describe the time utilisation of the existing wet storage method after the completion of additional SF storage capacities, and the barrier inspections against the leakage of radioactive substances to the environment.	It is included in Part A, Chap. II.7, II.9 and Part C, Chap. III.18.
2.2.13.	To work out an assessment of cumulative impacts of this investment action (i.e. to take into account the existing impacts on the nature and landscape protection interests in the affected territory), of the impact of the proposed activity on the neighbouring protected territories and subject of their protection, protected trees as well as on the elements of the territorial system of ecological stability, important landscape elements, protected species, biotopes with national importance and biotopes with European importance, both during construction and operation (Protected Area Dedova jama and Protected Area Malé Vážky, to assess the possible impact of the proposed activity on the element of the territorial system of ecological stability, biocentre with regional importance RBC3 – Červeník – Ypsilon, Protected Bird Area Špačince-Nižná Fields). If the assessment shows that it is necessary, to propose measures for the protection of the subject of protection in the protected areas declared by Regulation of the Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic No. 27/2011 Coll. pursuant to Article 26 (6) of Act No. 543/2002 Coll. on nature and landscape protection.	The assessment of impacts on the nature and landscape protection interests is described in Part C Chap. III.7 and III.9. Considering the location of the additionally built storage areas on the premises of JAVYS, a.s. and the expected impacts, the need to propose measures improving the protection of protected areas was not identified. The cumulative impacts are evaluated in Part C, Chap. 17.
2.2.14.	In terms of water protection:	During construction preparation, construction, operation and

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To describe the provision of observance of all legal provisions for the protection of surface and ground waters and for the protection against floods during the investment plan preparation and execution. • The describe the waste water cycle and management. • To document that in preparing and executing the investment one must be mindful of protection of surface waters and ground waters and prevent any undesirable leakage of harmful substances into the soil, ground and surface waters. • To document that in preparing and executing the change of the proposed activity, harmful and especially harmful substances must be treated in a way as to observe the provisions of Article 39 of Act No. 364/2004 Coll. on waters and on the amendment to Act of the Slovak National Council No. 372/1990 Coll. on offences as amended (Water Act) and Regulation No. 100/2005 Coll. laying down the details of hazardous substances treatment, of emergency plan details and of the procedure in solving an extraordinary water deterioration. 	<p>decommissioning, the investor is obliged to observe all the provisions of the Slovak water protection legislation.</p> <p>The requirements for the observance of legal provisions for the protection of surface and ground waters, protection against floods, soil protection are included in the investment plan's Terms of Reference and their fulfilment is provided for the entire service life of the installation.</p> <p>Waste water management is described in Part B Chap. II.2.</p> <p>The requirements for harmful and especially harmful substances management are included in the investment plan's Terms of Reference and their fulfilment is provided for the entire service life of the installation.</p>
2.2.15.	<p>To document whether new air pollution sources in the category of medium or large sources will come into existence within the framework of the activity. In the next process stage, to supplement the part "Air Protection" in accordance with Article 17 (2) of Act No. 137/2010 Coll. on air as amended by Act No. 318/2012 Coll. and its implementing regulations (hereinafter "Act on Air") and to ask the respective air protection authority for issuance of a consent to source construction siting pursuant to Article 17 (1) (a) of the Act on Air (diesel generator sets, backup boiler room), whose approval falls, pursuant to Article 26 of the Act on Air, under the competence of the</p>	<p>The outputs into the air are included in Part B Chap. II.1 and the impacts on air in Part C Chap. III.4.</p> <p>It will not be necessary to build new air pollution sources for the operation of the additionally built SF storage capacities. The existing diesel generator serves to provide electric power supply for important nuclear safety elements and its power will also be sufficient for the additionally built storage areas.</p>

	respective district environmental office.	
2.2.16.	To describe the general technical requirements and general conditions of operation pursuant to Annex No. 3 to Regulation of the Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic No. 410/2012 Coll. implementing certain provisions of the Act on Air, which apply to such activities that should be applied at the time of construction, when the activities producing dust emissions will take place (demolition of structures, construction, transport).	The impacts on the the air during construction are described in Part B Chap. II.1.
2.2.17.	To prepare a more detailed description of geological conditions (geological structure of the territory, engineering geological conditions, geodynamic phenomena, the state of pollution of geological environment and to mark out the area, on which the activity under assessment will be executed, and to add more readable pictures.	It is included in Part C, Chap. II.1 and II.2.
2.2.18.	To describe the possible impact of radioactive substance discharges into water courses.	It is included in Part C, Chap. III.5 and Chap. III. 18
2.2.19.	To describe the assessment of the ground water radiation situation state and development due to the investment.	Ground water pollution is described in Part C, Chap. II.15. Ground waters will not be affected by the construction and operation of the investment plan. The proposed activity will not change the radiation situation of ground waters.
2.2.20.	To evaluate the expected irradiation dose load on the workers and inhabitants for individual variants of the proposed activity and to assess the operating risks for individual variants of the proposed activity in terms of radiation protection.	It is included in Part B, Chap. II.5 and the assessment of impacts on the population is included in Part C, Chap.III.1 and it will be included in the particular safety documentation submitted to the Public Health Authority of the Slovak Republic in accordance with the valid legislation. The evaluation of expected radiation load on the personnel will be solved in the particular documentation submitted to the Public

		Health Authority of the Slovak Republic for siting and construction in accordance with Article 13 (5) (a) of the first item of Act on the National Council of the Slovak Republic No.355/2007 Coll., and the project will contain effective solutions of personnel protection against ionising radiation effects in order to observe the condition of optimisation in terms of radiation protection.
2.2.21	To pay sufficient attention to the description of excavation soil management if it is waste in accordance with the Act on Waste, considering the long duration of building work and expected extensive excavation work. To supplement detailed information about the material type and excavation soil management. It is not clear from the investment plan text whether in case of excavation work, excavation soil will represent waste to be managed in compliance with the Act on Wastes, or it will be so-called non-contaminated soil, which is defined in Article 1 (2) (j) of Act No. 223/2001 Coll. on wastes as "non-contaminated soil and other naturally occurring material excavated during building work, provided that the material will be certainly used for the purpose of construction in the natural state in the place where it was excavated". If it is planned to use excavation soil in the place of excavation, to state these facts precisely.	The excavation soil produced during building work will not be governed by the Act on Wastes as the soil will be used in the place of excavations on the company's premises.
2.2.22	To assess and take into account other relevant requirements included in the statements delivered to the Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic on the proposed change of activity, with an emphasis on the statements of the affected municipalities.	Annex No.5
2.2.23	To evaluate in writing the consideration of all the requirements and recommendations from the statements delivered to the proposed change of activity or to substantiate the failure to fulfil them and to	Annex No. 6

	evaluate the fulfilment of individual items of this Assessment Scope for the proposed activity.	
Requirements of Hungary		
2.3.1	To propose elements of the monitoring system of the equipment related to the additionally built SF storage facility Jaslovské Bohunice within a time period providing the corresponding time for the execution of necessary and efficient measures in case of surface water and air contamination.	The monitoring system of the activity under assessment and environment is described in Part C, Chap. VI.
2.3.2	To describe the information system that will ensure that in case of any event (failure) the respective Hungarian authorities will be provided with adequate information as soon as possible.	The duties to report the events causing extraordinary deterioration of or threat to water quality by JAVYS, a.s. to the respective supervisory authorities are described in the document 8-PLN-010 "Plan of emergency measures against pollution of surface and ground waters at JAVYS, a.s., at the site of Jaslovské Bohunice", which was approved by the Slovak Environmental Inspection of the Slovak Republic. Pursuant to the Act on Water, the Slovak Environmental Inspection also performs tasks in case of cross-border water quality deterioration on the border rivers. In compliance with the Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River, the headquarters of the Slovak Environmental Inspection provide for the continuous operation of the International Warning Centre PIAC 04 Slovakia, which is part of the international system of timely warning and prevention in the entire territory of the Danube river-basin (the Accident Emergency Warning System (AEWS)), and fulfils the tasks of the Slovak Republic in the international system of water protection and in case of cross-border water quality deterioration on the border rivers. <u>All the involved countries will receive information about an emergency event meaning a water quality emergency situation through this warning system.</u>

		<p>The monitoring of radioactivity level in the air, water and foodstuffs proving the compliance with basic standards is provided by the radiation monitoring network – RMN (a requirement in accordance with Article 35 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)) and by the Radiation Monitoring Network Centre (RMNC). Based on Government Resolution of the Slovak Republic No. 674/2004 dated 7 July 2004, the Public Health Authority was entrusted with the task of the national coordinator to transfer the monitoring results to the institution authorised by the European Commission. SHMU (Slovak Hydrometeorological Institute) is the sub-coordinator of the fulfilment of this article. The RMN provides in particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • measurement of specified values in the specified environmental components in the system of measuring points according to a time schedule, • evaluation of irradiation of the population and contribution to the irradiation caused by the activities leading to irradiation during a normal radiation situation, • background data for systematic regulation of population irradiation, • data on the radioactive contamination of the environment necessary for decision-making on performance and ending of interventions and measures limiting irradiation during a radiation threat, • data on the level of irradiation for informing the population and for the international exchange of information about the radiation situation in the territory of the Slovak Republic. <p>In addition to the two systems, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority</p>
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		<p>of the Slovak Republic is the coordinator of a task for the fast exchange of information in case of a radiation emergency state (the system ECURIE - European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange). The technical and expert support for ECURIE is provided by the system EURDEP (European Union Radiation Data Exchange Platform), which includes the national databases of radiation monitoring in one central database. This one database is accessible to all the involved parties. The Joint Research Centre (EC JRC) in Ispra, Italy, is an expert and technical centre for the system.</p> <p>SHMU is the EURDEP system bearer for the Slovak Republic. SHMU is the only representative of the Slovak Republic in the database of the timely warning radiation system EURDEP (European Union Radiation Data Exchange Platform), which includes the national databases of radiation monitoring in one central database accessible to all the involved parties.</p> <p>The radiation monitoring of SHMU fulfils the contractual obligations of bilateral agreements with Austria, Hungary and since 2013, with the Czech Republic. Their fulfilment is checked by the contracting partners on a regular basis.</p>
2.3.3	To describe the system of barriers that will prevent contamination by undesirable substances from getting into Danube waters.	<p>Waste waters produced in wet SF storage are removed through piping systems to the technological equipment for treatment and conditioning. Waste waters from the RAW TCT can only be discharged after the fulfilment of the limits specified by decisions of the Public Health Authority of the Slovak Republic and District Office in Trnava. The pipelines removing waste waters from the RAW TCT to water bodies contain check points with continuous monitoring of waste water activity (Part C, Chap. VI.I.). When the exceeding of permitted values is signalled, the measures interrupting water discharge are immediately taken.</p>

2.3.4	To include data on possible impacts of the completed SF storage facility on surface waters of Dudváh, Váh and Danube.	It is included in Part C, Chap. III.5 and Chap. III. 18.
2.3.5	To perform the assessment according to individually proposed alternatives - individual variants in the Notice (Variant 0, 1, 2, 3).	The evaluation of individual variants is the subject of the Assessment Report. In Part C, Chap. V - selection of an optimum variant according to the set criteria.
2.3.6	To describe, how the nuclear installation will be checked and maintained on a regular basis during the construction, in operation and during commissioning in order to prevent any leaks of contamination.	It is included in Part C, Chap. VI.
2.3.7	To provide available information about the assessment processes of similar planned projects that are under way (i.e. whether the completion of the interim spent fuel storage facility at Jaslovské Bohunice is an alternative to the planned construction of the new interim SF storage facility at Mochovce).	The proposed storage capacity expansion is an alternative to the process of assessment of the dry interim storage facility at Mochovce, which is under way and whose proposer is the company SE, a.s., and it considers storage of SF from the operation of all currently operated reactor units of NPPs (2 units of the V2 NPP, 2 units of the EMO NPP) and also storage of SF from EMO NPP Units 3 and 4 under completion. This fact is included in Part A, Chap.II.2 and Part C Chap. III.16.1 of the Assessment Report. The solution proposed by JAVYS, a.s. is in compliance with the requirements of Act No. 541/2006 Coll. on peaceful use of nuclear energy and the approved strategic documents.
2.3.8	To specify whether the existing expansion of storage capacity of the nuclear installation at Bohunice will reach the total required capacity for all the nuclear power plants in the Slovak Republic or spent nuclear fuel will be stored in individual places of production, at the nuclear power plants (Mochovce and Bohunice).	The requirement is evaluated in 2.2.4 of Annex No. 6 to the Assessment Report.
2.3.9	To supplement data on the decommissioning of the original spent fuel storage facility and the expanded spent fuel storage facility, to	The decommissioning of the spent fuel storage facility is described in Part B, Chap. II.8.

	provide the proposed method of decommissioning.	
2.3.10	To describe the radiation impacts of the proposed investment on the environment and human health (normal operation impacts, impacts of failures in comparison with normal operation, as well as impacts during expected accidents, to describe expected emission routes and sources of emissions, to set the expected concentrations within the framework of the activity and to state the values of probable doses, etc.)	<p>The impacts of the proposed activity are described in Part C, Chap. III, impacts on human health are in Part C, Chap. III.1.</p> <p>The detailed assessment of the impact of the proposed activity during both standard and non-standard operation, including the cumulative impact, will be included in the "Safety Documentation" that will be part of the permission process.</p>
2.3.11	To provide the calculation of dose increase in the environment due to the SF storage facility construction at Bohunice and to set the radiation adherence in the area, for the case of normal operation and for the case of emergency event, failure.	<p>The impact on radiation load is described in Part C, Chap. III.1.</p> <p>The detailed assessment of the impact of the proposed activity during both standard and non-standard operation, including the cumulative impact, will be included in the "Safety Documentation" that will be part of the permission process.</p>
2.3.12	To describe the system of radiation monitoring.	The monitoring system is described in Part C, Chap. VI.
2.3.13	To describe the control systems within the framework of nuclear installation operation (e.g. the way of sampling, measurement methods, the way of evaluation of the data obtained etc.).	<p>The description of control of technological systems is included in Part A Chap. II.9.</p> <p>The description of environment control is included in Part C Chap. VI.</p>
2.3.14	To describe the technical measures that will be taken to prevent and eliminate malfunctions (i.e. abnormal radioactive emissions) and to monitor the emissions possibly affecting the environment.	The measures are described in Part C, Chap. IV and in Chap. III.19.
2.3.15	To provide data on concentrations within the framework of activity execution and on the values of probable emission doses determining the isotopes expected on the border between Hungary and Slovakia both in routine operation and in case of failure, which would cause probably the largest radioactive emissions, with a reference to the design basis and beyond design basis accidents.	<p>It is included in Part C, Chapter III.1.</p> <p>For the calculation of doses at a distance of 100 km (the area of northern Hungary), the programme ESTE AI was used. The maximum calculated effective dose of a representative person from the population caused at maximum limits of gaseous and liquid discharges is 3.79×10^{-7} Sv.</p>

		In comparison with the limit set by the decision of the Public Health Authority of the Slovak Republic for all nuclear installations of JAVYS, a.s., which amounts to 3.2×10^{-5} Sv, the calculated received dose is lower by two orders.
Requirements of the Republic of Austria		
2.3.16	To supplement more detailed cross-border impacts of the proposed activity.	It is included in Part A, Chapter II.17.
2.3.17	To assess the states of the installation that can occur as a consequence of seismic events, floods or fire.	Operating risks are included in Part C, Chap. III.19.
2.3.18	To assess the operation of the storage installations in connection with fuel handling.	The assessment of legislation requirements (in particular in the area of nuclear safety included in Table No. C. III.18./01 page 126) for individual SF storage packaging sets is included in Part C Chap. III.19 in the section "Legislative requirements, defence-in-depth, technical solutions".
2.3.19	To assess the operation of the additionally built interim SF storage facility in connection with possible adversely interacting installations in the area.	Cumulative impacts with other operations of JAVYS, a.s. and SE, a.s. are included in Part C Chap. III.1 and III.17, III.18.
2.3.20	To describe the storage technology more concretely so that it is possible to assess correctly the environmental impacts of the interim SF storage facility, in particular the risks of greater release of the stored radioactive substances into the environment, they must be described in detail, if possible, with detailed data on the planned technology. It is also necessary to analyse the above-mentioned because the proposed variants have a considerable number of container types.	The description of the storage technologies is included in Part A, Chap. II.9 with individual variants under assessment.
2.3.21	For the planned use of SF storage vessels, to include the legislative conditions for licensing in accordance with the valid legislation.	The requirements for individual SF storage packaging sets resulting from Act No. 541/2004 Coll. on peaceful use of nuclear energy (Atomic Act) and on the amendment to certain acts as amended, from Regulation of the Nuclear Regulatory

		<p>Authority of the Slovak Republic No. 30/2012 Coll. laying down details on the requirements for nuclear materials, radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management and from Regulation of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic No. 430/2011 Coll. on nuclear safety requirements as amended, which are in compliance with the international legal documents and recommendations of the IAEA and EC, are included in Part C Chap. III.19 in the section "Legislative requirements, defence-in-depth, technical solutions".</p>
2.3.22	<p>For the containers used in the interim SF storage facility, to specify the following: T 12, T 13 and KZ 48, as well as the transport container TK C-30, the following data:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Dimensions, geometric shape of the containers; ✓ Maximum number of spent fuel assemblies; ✓ Neutron screen – the material, provision of subcriticality. 	<p>The transport container TK C-30 and the storage casks VJP T12 and T13 have a cylindrical shape of the fuel basket. The newer compact cask for SF storage KZ 48 has rectangular ground plan with cut edges in order to better utilise the space in the storage pool.</p> <p>Dimensions:</p> <p>TK C-30</p> <p>height: 4267 mm diameter: 2500 mm</p> <p>KZ 48</p> <p>height: 3460 mm diameter: 1460 mm</p> <p>T-12</p> <p>height: 3460 mm diameter: 1460 mm</p> <p>T-13</p> <p>height: 3460 mm diameter: 1460 mm</p> <p>Subcriticality is provided by boron content in the structure of fuel basket material. It is designed in such a way that the condition of subcriticality is met during all normal and abnormal states at both transportation and storage. The maximum number of fuel assemblies in KZ 48 is 48 pieces, for T 12 it is 30 pieces</p>

		and for T 13 it is 18 pieces of spent fuel assemblies. The neutron screen for SF stored in the existing ISFS is also provided by the way of storage underwater in individual storage pools.
2.3.23	To describe in detail and substantiate and/or confute the consideration how the interim SF storage facility will be operated without "protection" from the nuclear power plant. It is obvious from the Notice that the interim SF storage facility is reliant on nuclear power plant operation (e.g. disposal of radioactive waste waters, vessel handling and opening, decontamination of vessels, etc.). However, it is not possible to exclude the situation that the nuclear power plant will be out of operation (premature shutdown or shutdown after a serious accident).	<p>The operating fluids and energies for the ISFS NI operation were provided from the V1 NPP technologies that are now under decommissioning. Within the framework of individual V1 NPP decommissioning projects financed in particular from EBRD sources, the technological interconnection between the ISFS and V1 NPP is gradually removed and individual distribution systems are executed independently from V1 NPP operation. To provide compressed air and nitrogen in the ISFS, a compressor station and nitrogen reducing station was built near the interim SF storage facility. To supply other media such as demineralised water and cooled water, separate pipelines of the fluids will be constructed, with the interconnection to the RAW management NIs in operation at Jaslovské Bohunice; active liquid fluids as well as other operating radioactive wastes will be disposed in the existing treatment lines at the site so the ISFS will be capable of further independent operation without any relations to the V1 NPP under decommissioning.</p> <p>Physical protection of the structure is solved independently from operation of other nuclear installations.</p>
2.3.24	To describe further procedure regarding the spent fuel assemblies after the expiry of the interim SF storage facility service life.	<p>It is included in Part B, Chapter II.8.</p> <p>Additional information:</p> <p>In the currently valid "Strategy of Back-End of Nuclear Energy Peaceful Use in the Slovak Republic" approved by Government Resolution No. 26/2014 dated 15 January 2014, two alternatives are considered for SF management back-end (so-called "dual way"):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. direct disposal of SF (along with other radioactive wastes that cannot be disposed in the RAW repository Mochovce) in the deep geological repository built in the

		<p>territory of the Slovak Republic; the Strategy considers this alternative to be the preferred one,</p> <p>2. SF disposal in an international repository;</p> <p>In the next years, the activities within the framework of the first alternative will continue as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a system of involvement of the public will be created, • the activities leading to the selection of suitable location or within it, a place for possible execution of a national deep repository will be executed
2.3.25	To describe the Zero Variant correctly, to not describe only the negative consequences introduced in the background documents but also the positive aspects, if any, such as the limitation of the problem of spent fuel assemblies disposal after the shutdown of the nuclear power plant (the quantity of waste to be disposed will not increase, the radioactive inventory on site will not increase, etc.).	<p>The evaluation of individual variants is the subject of the Assessment Report.</p> <p>The Zero Variant is described in Part A, Chap. II.9 and the impacts of operation are described in Part C, Chap. III.</p>
2.3.26	In examining safety and risks, to also take into account the interaction among all nuclear installations of JAVYS, a.s., at the site with the planned equipment, in particular in case of an incident (cumulative and synergetic impacts).	<p>Cumulative impacts with other operations of JAVYS, a.s. and SE, a.s. are included in Part C Chap. III.1 and III.17, III.18. The detailed assessment of the impact of the proposed activity during both standard and non-standard operation, including the cumulative impact, will be included in the "Safety Documentation" that will be part of the permission process.</p>
2.3.27	To add the data describing the consequences of events that could also affect the state Burgenland.	It is included in Part A, Chapter II.17.
2.3.28	In terms of environmental impacts, Burgenland considers it suitable to add information regarding the liability for damages in terms of financing the correction of possible impacts on the landscape as a consequence of possible events within the nuclear installation operation.	<p>The National Council of the Slovak Republic agreed with the accession of the Slovak Republic to the <i>Vienna Convention</i> on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage in its Resolution No. 71 dated 25 January 1995 and approved by the President of the Slovak Republic on 23 February 1995. The international legal duties of incorporation of the multilateral international convention into the national law of the Slovak Republic were</p>

		<p>fulfilled by Act No. 541/2004 Coll. on peaceful use of nuclear energy (Atomic Act) and on the amendment to certain acts. In the Atomic Act, civil liability for nuclear damage is discussed in Article 29 and Article 30 and also other provisions refer to it implicitly (e.g. Article 6 (2) (h) in connection with Annex No. 1 Item C (n), Item D (h), Annex No. 2 Item A (g) of the Atomic Act). With the effect from 1 January 2014, the amendment to the Atomic Act, Act No. 143/2013 Coll. introduces an increase in the limits of operator's liability for nuclear damage caused by every individual nuclear event: a) for nuclear installations with a nuclear reactor or nuclear reactors for energy purposes during commissioning and operation up to € 300,000,000 (which is a four-time higher limit than the originally set one by the Atomic Act from 2004), other nuclear installations during commissioning and operation, transportation of radioactive materials and all the nuclear installations in the stage of decommissioning up to € 185,000,000 (which is a 3.7-times higher limit than the originally set one by the Atomic Act from 2004). In December 2014, the government bill on civil liability for nuclear damage and on its financial coverage and on the amendment to certain acts was submitted, approved and sent to the parliament.</p>
2.3.29	<p>To add information about the longest period of operation of the nuclear installation – expanded interim SF storage facility, and to provide the planned further utilisation of the nuclear installation after the possible shutdown of the nuclear power plants and whether the closure or possibly decommissioning of the existing and expanded interim SF storage facility is planned and will be carried out.</p>	<p>It is included in Part A, Chap. II.7 and in Part C, Chap. III.18. It is also supplemented with information specified in 2.3.23 of Annex No. 6 to the Assessment Report.</p>
2.3.30	<p>To add data on total maximum radiation situation of the storage facility.</p>	<p>The dose rate equivalent on the boundaries of the controlled area (CA) < 2.5 µSv/h. The value of radioactive contamination for the areas out of the</p>

		CA < 0.3 Bq/cm ² for radionuclides with radiotoxicity Class I in accordance with Annex No. 8 to Government Order No. 345/2006 Coll.
2.3.31	To declare nuclides and half life of radioactive nuclides.	²³⁵ U half life – 7.04x10 ⁸ years, ²³⁸ U half life – 4.468x10 ⁹ years.
2.3.32	To state the maximum value of some nuclides as a necessity due to the whole safety concept.	The limit value of radionuclides in SF is not set (it is not limited). The limit for SF transportation from the NPP nuclear unit to the ISFS is only the residual power.
2.3.33	To explain whether there is no duplicity of Proposer's subsidies with public financing for financing the construction, operation and closure of both the existing and expanded SF storage facility.	The funding of the construction and operation of the existing SF storage facility is consistently accounted in the company's bookkeeping in relation to individual sources of financing (in this particular case the National Nuclear Fund, BIDSF and company's internal sources). We state that funding from the sources of the National Nuclear Fund and BIDSF is only possible after a proper approval process in the respective National Nuclear Fund's bodies or approval procedures for the provision of BIDSF subsidies. Taking into account these processes and implemented control mechanisms, there can be no duplicity at all in providing the subsidies from the National Nuclear Fund and BIDSF for the same purpose. It is assumed that funding of SF storage capacity expansion will be provided from several sources, with a preferable use of internal JAVYS sources and possible subsidies from the National Nuclear Fund.
2.3.34	The risk analyses to be carried out will have to solve the probability of occurrence and the maximum probable effect cumulatively as it is usual in risk assessments.	Operating risks are included in Part C, Chap. III.19. The detailed assessment of the impact of the proposed activity during both standard and non-standard operation, including the cumulative impact, will be included in the "Safety Documentation" that will be part of the permission process.
2.3.35	To describe the possibility of plane crash on the interim SF storage facility, which is very improbable with extremely large consequences. The low	It is included in Part A, Chapter III.19. The detailed evaluation of plane crash impacts will be part of the "Safety Documentation"

	probability risks including the individuals affected by activity consequences are socially acceptable. Therefore, possible accidents should be examined in detail and assessed in terms of the worst possible consequences.	that will be part of the permitting process.
Requirements of the Republic of Poland		
2.3.36	To add information regarding the geological and hydrological conditions due to site selection for nuclear installation construction in the area with sedimentary rock. To state the characteristics of the loesses occurring here.	It is included in Part C, Chap. II.1 and Chap.II.2.
2.3.37	To specify in detail the description of the nuclear installation construction concept with certain proving of planned preventive measures regarding: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ continuity of loess cover (continuation of the sedimentation surface), ✓ planned foundation depth of the new structures, ✓ expected way of improving and / or replacing the loess bedrock (foundation soil) in building the foundations of the civil structures of the nuclear installation in case of occurrence of such areas in the place of the structure construction. 	The requirement will be processed depending on the results of the geological survey in the project documentation.
2.3.38	To provide information on the types of <i>DBA (Design Basis Accidents)</i> ¹ , which can be considered for this nuclear installation, and on the way of taking them into account in project implementation.	It is included in Part C, Chap. III.19.
2.3.39	To add information on the environmental monitoring in the surroundings of the nuclear installation.	It is described in Part C, Chap. VI.I.
2.3.40	To provide information whether the planned construction of additional spent fuel storage facility at Jaslovské Bohunice will prevent the construction of spent fuel storage facility at Mochovce, which the Republic of Poland was informed about in February 2014.	The proposed storage capacity expansion is an alternative to the process of assessment of the dry interim storage facility at Mochovce, which is under way and whose proposer is the company SE, a.s., and it considers storage of SF from the operation of all currently operated reactor units of NPPs (2 units

		<p>of the V2 NPP, 2 units of the EMO NPP) and also storage of SF from EMO NPP Units 3 and 4 under completion.</p> <p>This fact is included in Item A II.2 (page 12) and C III.16.1 (page 119) of the Assessment Report.</p> <p>The solution proposed by JAVYS, a.s. is in compliance with the requirements of Act No. 541/2006 Coll. on peaceful use of nuclear energy and the approved strategic documents.</p>
Requirements of the Czech Republic		
2.3.41	It requests to evaluate the impact of the new nuclear installation with an emphasis on the development of the South Moravian Region, in particular the impacts caused by natural disasters (flood, earthquake..., incidents or accidents).	It is included in Part A, Chapter II.17.
2.4	In a separate chapter, to take into account and evaluate the relevant requirements for the EIA process included in the statements of the affected countries: Czech Republic, Republic of Poland, Hungary and Republic of Austria.	They are included in this Annex No. 6.