


Anlage 1: Standort der Variante 1 im Gelände der Gesellschaft JAVYS, a.s., Katastergebiet Jaslovské Bohunice




Legenda:

 Umbozenie variantu č. 1


№	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
№	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
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№	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
№	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100

Anlage 2: Standort der Variante 1 in der Nähe des Geländes der Gesellschaft JAVYS, a.s., Katastergebiet Velke Kostolany




Anlage 3: Lageplan der Standorte der Kernkraftanlagen am Standort Jaslovské Bohunice  
(Masstab 1:50.000)

- ⊗ IS RAO - variant 1
- ⊗ IS RAO - variant 2



# Anlage 4/1: Integrallager für radioaktive Abfälle – Schnitte



±0,000=170,240 m n.m. – VÝŠKOVÝ SYSTÉM BALT PO VÝROVNANI  
 (ELEVATION SYSTEM BALD AFTER LEVELING)


ČÍSLO	1	07-02-016.01-30-001	007
NAZEV	INTEGRALNÍ SKLAD RADIOAKTIVNÍCH ODPADŮ (S RO)		
DOKUMENTACE	PRŮBĚŽNÁ INTEGRALNÍ SKLAD RADIOAKTIVNÍCH ODPADŮ (S RO) PRŮBĚŽNÁ INTEGRALNÍ SKLAD RADIOAKTIVNÍCH ODPADŮ (S RO)		
PROJEKTANT	ČESKOPROJEKT, s.r.l. Sídlo: Svatopluk 13, Praha 7 IČ: 267 08 69		
DOPRAVCE	DOKUMENTACE INTEGRALNÍ SKLAD RADIOAKTIVNÍCH ODPADŮ (S RO)		
PROJEKTANT	VÝVOJ: I. BŘEZINA NÁČRTEK: M. HANUŠEK MĚŘÍ: M. HANUŠEK KONTROLOVÁNÍ: M. HANUŠEK VÝSTUPOVÝ PRŮBĚŽNÝ PRŮJEM: SO 810 REZY A-A, B-B ČÍSLO PRŮBĚŽNÝCH ČÁSTI PRŮJEMU		
PROJEKTANT	MIRA L200 PRŮBĚŽNÝ PRŮJEM SO 810 REZY A-A, B-B ČÍSLO PRŮBĚŽNÝCH ČÁSTI PRŮJEMU		
PROJEKTANT	MIRA L200 PRŮBĚŽNÝ PRŮJEM SO 810 REZY A-A, B-B ČÍSLO PRŮBĚŽNÝCH ČÁSTI PRŮJEMU		



## Anlage 5/1: Beispiele von Verpackungen, die zur Lagerung von radioaktiven Abfällen im Integrallager verwendet werden

### Abgeschirmte Container:


Der Container wurde zur Sicherstellung des hohen Sicherheitsniveaus für einen sehr günstigen Preis entwickelt. Der Container kann in allen Ländern, die über Produktionsstandorte verfügen, hergestellt werden. Der Container besteht aus einem Stahlbetonkörper mit zweifachem Verschlussystem. Dieser Doppelmantel besteht aus einem Innen- und Aussenmantel aus Stahl, wobei beide Mäntel in einen Hauptmantel verschweisst werden. Der Raum zwischen Stahlmänteln wird mit Schwerbeton ausgefüllt. Beide Verschlüsse (Deckel) können verschweisst oder verschraubt werden. Container des Typs CONSTOR® wurden ähnlich wie Container CASTOR® umfangreichen Tests unterzogen (Fall- und Brandtests).



## Anlage 5/2: Beispiele von Verpackungen, die zur Lagerung von radioaktiven Abfällen im Integriertlager verwendet werden



### Transporteinrichtung – Fass 200 dm<sup>3</sup>, MEVA, Typ 0488



Sud MEVA typ 0488

Das Fass 200 dm<sup>3</sup> MEVA, Typ 0488, wird aus verzinktem Stahlblech mit der Dicke 1,2 mm hergestellt; der Mantel wird verschweisst und mit gespressten Aussteifungen verfestigt. Der Boden wird mit dem Mantel mit mehrfachen Sicherheitsfalzen verbunden.

Am Fassboden ist die Produktionsbezeichnung des Fasses geprägt. Der Fassdeckel wird aus verzinktem Stahlblech mit der Dicke 1,2 mm gefertigt und mit dem Mantel mit Hilfe einer Gummidichtung verbunden; zugleich wird der Deckel mit einem Kreis mit äusserem Hebelverschluss abgesichert. Fässer werden stehend gelagert und befördert. Die Tragfähigkeit des Fasses beträgt ca. 420 kg. Das Fass wurde als Verpackung auf seine Trag- und Stapelfähigkeit und Fallverhalten geprüft und zertifiziert. Bei diesen Tests wurde die Kompaktheit der Verpackung geprüft.

## Anlage 5/3: Beispiele von Verpackungen, die zur Lagerung von radioaktiven Abfällen im Integrallager verwendet werden

### Faserbetoncontainer

Der Container besteht aus folgenden Teilen: Körper, Deckel und zwei Stopfen. Die grundlegenden Teile des Containers sind in der folgenden Abbildung dargestellt.

Dieser Container in kubischer Form dient zur Lagerung und Beförderung von radioaktivem Abfall und folgende Haupteigenschaften:

Außenabmessungen (ohne Toleranzen)


Höhe H : 1.70 m

Breite B : 1.70 m

Länge L : 1.70 m

Fassungsvolumen VU : ~ 3.00 m<sup>3</sup>

Das Höchstgewicht des gefüllten VBK-Containers darf nicht 15.000 kg übersteigen.





Anlage 5/4: Beispiele von Verpackungen, die zur Lagerung von radioaktiven Abfällen im Integrallager verwendet werden

Abgeschirmte Komponente mit grossen Abmessungen (Druckbehälter Reaktor) während der Beförderung ins Integrallager – Aufnahme aus der Beförderung des Druckbehälters des Reaktors in Greifswald, Deutschland.



## Anlage 6/1: Interim storage Nord – Integrallager Nord EWN Greifswald, Deutschland




Gesamtansicht auf Integral-Repository Nord EWN Deutschland

### ZLN – Zwischenlager Nord

- Zwischenlager für abgebrannten Brennstoff
- Behandlung und Konditionierung von radioaktivem Material
- Zwischen- und Abklinglagerung für radioaktives Material

<b>Lagerfläche</b>	20.000 m <sup>2</sup>
<b>Abmaße</b>	240 m x 140 m x 18 m
<b>Hallen 1-7</b>	Radioaktives Material: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- in 20'-Container</li><li>- in Gußbehältern</li><li>- in Betoncontainern</li><li>- in Stahlcontainern</li><li>- in Fässern</li><li>- als Großkomponenten</li></ul>
<b>Halle 8</b>	Brennelemente in CASTOR-Behältern (CASTOR <sup>®</sup> 440/84)
<b>Massen</b>	Hallen 1-7 ca. 110.000 Mg Halle 8 585 Mg Schwermetall



Anlage 6/2: Interim storage Nord – Integrallager Nord EWN Greifswald, Deutschland



ZLN - Halle 7 mit Dampferzeuger aus den KKW-Blöcken



ZLN - Halle 2 mit 20'Containern




ZLN  
Transportbehälter CASTOR®KRB-MOX wird aus dem Transportgestell gehoben




Halle 8 des Transportbehälterlagers im ZLN mit 65 CASTORen

Anlage 7: Lageplan von Objekten zur Überwachung der Grundwasserpegel im Gebiet, das durch die Stauanlage Gabčíkovo beeinflusst wird, und Karte der typischen Grundwasserpegel




Obr. V.81 Situácia všetkých objektov na sledovanie hladín podzemných vôd v území ovplyvnenom VD Gabčíkovo



Obr. V.86 Charakteristické hladiny podzemnej vody v roku 2003

Anlage 8: Darstellung von grenzenüberschreitenden Grundwasserformationen in der Schicht der Quartärformationen und Quartärsteinen



*CEZHRANIČNÉ ÚTVARY PODZEMNÝCH VÔD VO VRSIVE KVARTÉRNÝCH ÚTVAROV PODZEMNÝCH VÔD*



*VYMEDZENIE ÚTVAROV PODZEMNÝCH VÔD NA SLOVENSKU V PREDKVARTÉRNÝCH HORNINÁCH*




Anlage 9: Darstellung von Isolinien der Grundwasserpegel im Gebiet, das durch die Stauanlage Gabčíkovo beeinflusst wird (vor und nach Inbetriebnahme der Stauanlage)




Obr. III.7 Izolínie hladín podzemných vôd pred a po uvedení vodného diela Gabčíkovo do prevádzky



# Anlage 11: Lageplan der Überwachungsobjekte in der Umgebung des Kernkraftwerkes Bohunice




- LEGENDA:**
- + JB-7 -hydrogeologický vrt, studňa
  - Ž Dek -miesto odberu z povrchového toku
  - geologický rez
  - trasa podzemného potrubného gravitačného odváďača odpadových vôd z EBO - SOKOMAN



Podkladová mapa je výrezom vodohospodárskych máp SR (1:50 000 - 35-31 Senica, 35-32 Piešťany, 35-33 Trnava, 35-34 Hlohovec) spracovaných do digitálnej formy.




Anlage 12: Lageplan der Überwachungsobjekte in der Umgebung des Kernkraftwerkes Bohunice – Auszug aus dem Teil mit der Darstellung der Abwasserführung



Anlage 13: Gelände des Kernkraftwerkes Bohunice und Umgebung – hydrogeologische Analyse – Grundwasserpegel zum 18. 8. 2010

situácia k 18.8.2010



**LEGENDA:**

- 150.00 - nameraná hydroizohypsa hladiny podz. vód [m n.m.]
- $\rightarrow$  1.70E-014 - smer prúdenia p.v. a gradient hladiny p.v.
- $\rightarrow$  1.20E-002

- JB-3 - hydrogeologický vrt, studňa
- Ž DeK - miesto odberu z povrchového toku

## Comments of the foreign relevant parties

### Comments from the Austria

#### Statement of the Upper Austria state (Stellungnahme Land Oberösterreich)

##### 1. The text of the requirement

Regarding the purpose of the intent it is required to describe in detail the measures of nuclear safety, the concept of storing and transport and inspection of the waste acceptance for disposal. Describe the inspection of the package forms during storing, in detail describe the package forms as in intent e.g. by means of technical drawings.

**Fulfilment:** *Incorporated into the chapter A II.8.1 – 5 „Brief description of the technical and technological solution“*

##### 2. The text of the requirement

Required is the detailed description of the individual filtration systems of ventilation, the concept of contaminated waters handling and the electrical supply concept.

**Fulfilment:** *Assumption of the operation of the filtration equipment is stated in chapter A II.8.2 „ Technological solution “ detailed description is part of the design documentation.*

##### 3. The text of the requirement

To demonstrate the unreality of the transboundary impacts on environment, describe the scenarios of the impact possibilities and the conditions of the environment.

**Fulfilment:** *The assessment of transboundary impacts is described in Chapter A II.16 „ Expression of the impacts of the proposed transboundary borders “and shown in v chapter. C III.18 „ Comprehensive assessment of expected impacts in terms of their relevance and their comparison with existing legislation “*

##### 4. The text of the requirement

State the emergency scenarios to assess the impact of such events e.g. the fall of the aircraft, a strong explosion, large fires

**Fulfilment:** *Incorporated in chap. C III.19 „ Operational risks and their potential impact on the area (the possibility of accidents)“*

##### 5. The text of the requirement

Add the type, quantity and composition of radioactive wastes which should be stored in an interim storage.

**Fulfilment:** *Incorporated in Chap. A II.8.5 „ Description of the radioactive waste and planned quantities stored in the interim storage of radioactive waste “*

## Statement of the Vienna platform Atomkraftfrei (Stellungnahme Wiener Plattform „Atomkraftfrei“)

### 1. The text of the requirement

Given the purpose of the proposed facility it has been pointed to the possible danger of exceeding the total radioactivity of the interim storage in connection with short-term storing of RAW prior to its conditioning on RWTC (Radwaste Treatment Centre). They consider storing of such waste in contradiction to the purpose of the facility and ask the following questions.

- 1.1 How will be shielded the short-term storage from the long-term storage?(in what form)
- 1.2 How will be kept „ short-term storage "?
- 1.3 What does “short-term” exactly mean?
- 1.4 Is there the difference between the overall radioactivity of interim storage and maximum acceptable value?

**Fulfilment:** *The storing conditions are described in Chapter A II.2 „Purpose“ and II.8.5 „Description of radioactive waste and planned quantities stored in the interim storage of radioactive waste“*

### 2. The text of the requirement

What health measures and surveys are planned, respectively were performed by operators?

**Fulfilment:** *This question refers to the option No.3 (Mochovce site), which was based on the assessment scope assessed in the report. For the site Jaslovské Bohunice is the impact of the existing nuclear facilities assessed in chapter C III.1 „ Impact on the population “*

### 3. The text of the requirement

In what form will be the Austrian public informed about the possible dangers?

**Fulfilment:** *In accordance with applicable international agreements signed between Austria and the Slovak Republic.*

### 4. The text of the requirement

In the context of assessing the impact of external events the following questions are put:

- Of what kind are special safety precautions on the fence?
- **What kind of a control area it is?**
- What equipment is available to security forces if the large fire they is spread in the area?

- Are there mobile special forces, which could help for example, in an accident in connection with shipments of radioactive waste, fire fighting and decontamination?

**Fulfilment:** *Description of physical protection, control of nuclear facilities and fire protection is provided in chapter II.8.6 „technical and organizational means of fire protection and physical protection of interim storage of RAW“.*

#### 5. The text of the requirement

**In relation to accidents caused by operator, it contradicts the statement, that in case of package form, the radioactivity of gaseous discharges stated as limited shall not be exceeded. The following questions were raised:**

- What limit values are assigned to the individual containers (package forms)?
- Which radionuclides with which radiation (alpha-, beta-, gamma radiation) are stored in the various package forms?
- Were taken into account the various half-lives of radionuclides?

**Fulfilment:** *The method of storing and control of the accepted package forms with RAW is stated in chapter A II.2 „Purpose“ and II.8.5 „ Description of radioactive waste and planned quantities stored in the interim storage of radioactive waste“*

#### 6. The text of the requirement

What are the advantages and disadvantages of e.g. coating of reactors (as possible zero option)?

**Fulfilment:** *For activity „V1 NPP Decommissioning“ was recommended immediate decommissioning option, in which was not considered „reactor coating“. The reason for erection of the Interim Storage of RAW is given in Chapter II.6 „Reason for placement in the given area“*

#### 7. The text of the requirement

In connection with the consideration of the possibility of FCC disposal in 3 layers stacked on each other, the following doubts were raised in questions:

- a. How can be assured by this concept of storing the control and access to the lower containers?
- b. How can be found and possibly fixed leaks or damaged packages in the lower layers?

**Fulfilment:** *Performance is described in chapter A II.8.3 „The description of the operation“ and II.9 „Alternatives of the proposed activity“.*

#### 8. The text of the requirement

With regard to decontamination works is raised the following the question: How big are the decontamination spaces according to concept and how they are equipped?

**Fulfilment:** *Performance is described in chapter A II.8.2 „ technological solution“.*

#### 9. The text of the requirement

In relation to the concerns about construction financing, operation and shutdown of Interim Storage of RAW are raised the following questions:

Is there a financial plan...

- a. for routine inspection and possible recovery of all equipment?
- b. for qualification and further training of staff personnel?**
- c. the control system against hackers, terrorist attacks and thefts?**
- d. for research and development works on new knowledge in waste management?
- e. and finally decommissioning and shutdown of interim storage after the planned life of 70 years of operation?**

**Fulfilment:** *Incorporated in Chap. A II.8.7 „ Financing of the operation and decommissioning of IS of RAW“, and II.8.6 – „technical and organizational means of fire protection and physical protection of IS of RAW “*

#### **10. The text of the requirement**

The storing hall could be in terms of the description expanded if needed. The scope of extensibility is not applicable. What extension is possible with the currently planned capacity of management and control units?

**Fulfilment:** *Description of the modular system is provided in chapter A II.8 „ brief description of the technical and technological solutions “.*

#### **11. The text of the requirement**

Unspoken yet important question is what happens to the stored materials after 70 years of the planned operation of the designed storing hall?

What measures will be taken for facility of the repository after 70 years with the remaining and still radiating material (e.g. cesium Cs 137), if such materials cannot be replaced to the repository?

**Fulfilment:** *Incorporated in Chap. A II.8.4 „ Procedure for disposing of radioactive waste after lifetime expiration of IS of RAW “*

#### **12. The text of the requirement**

##### **Conclusion**

Vienna platform Atomkraftfrei (excluding nuclear power) rejects from the reasons given above, the establishment of the interim storage for radioactive waste in the current planned form. We require answering the questions and amending the uncertainties and data.

**Fulfilment:** *Questions which we were able to answer are incorporated in full scope of the report.*

## Statement of the Burgenland state (Stellungnahme Burgenland)

### 1. The text of the requirement

In particular, it will be necessary to describe in detail how to ensure the safety and protection of the environment over hundreds and thousands of years. This description should include the concept of isotopes extinction, which shall be stored.

**Fulfilment:** *Incorporated in the chapter A II.8.4 „ Procedure for disposing of radioactive waste after lifetime expiration of IS of RAW “*

### 2. The text of the requirement

Substantial seems also the type of financing of measures to be taken, concerning the lifetime of the storage and transfer of responsibility to future generations and provision of information on the status of filling and configuration of the storage.

**Fulfilment:** *Incorporated in Chap. A II.8.7 „ Financing of the operation and decommissioning of IS of RAW “, and II.8.3 „ Description of operation“*

### 3. The text of the requirement

To the intent of the interim storage for radioactive substances, the following questions were elaborated by special department:

- Is it secured, that storage shall be at the latest after the period of 70 years cancelled?
- How should be emptying of the storage after the period of 70 years performed?
- How will be the stored material handled?
- Will be for this purpose saved any financial means? (the cross financing of the territorial companies shall be excluded.)
- Is there any insurance for all options?

**Fulfilment:** *Incorporated in Chap. A II.8.4 Procedure for disposing of radioactive waste after lifetime expiration of IS of RAW, chapter A II.8.7. „Financing of the operation and decommissioning of IS of RAW, insurance is provided in accordance with the Act no. 541/2004 Coll. on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (Atomic Act) and on amending certain laws, as amended*

### 4. The text of the requirement

The report states on page 72 that the plane crash is an unlikely event. Because the potential consequences are very large, it is necessary to deal with this case. Also the cases of a similar nature as vandalism, terrorist acts, large fires should be taken into account.

**Fulfilment:** *Incorporated in chap. C III.19 „ Operational risks and their potential impact“*

### 5. The text of the requirement

How will the transfer of responsibilities including the provision of information on the state of fulfilment, organization, funding to the next generation proceed?

**Fulfilment:** *Incorporated in chap. A II.8.7 „ Financing of the operation and decommissioning of IS of RAW “ and in chapter A II.8.3 „Description of operation“.*

## Statement of the organisation Wiener Umweltschutz (Stellungnahme Wiener Umweltschutz)

### 1. The text of the requirement

To finalize:

- solving large-scale fire events
- How is the insurance against theft of radioactive substances ensured, eventually of the packages with the radioactive substances

**Fulfilment:** *Incorporated in Chap. C III.19 „ Operational risks and their potential impact “ and A II.8.6 „ technical and organizational means of fire protection and physical protection of IS of RAW “*

## Statement of the organisation of Österreichisches Ökologie Institut (Stellungnahme Österreichisches Ökologie Institut)

### 1. The text of the requirement

From the transboundary radioactive loads as a result of an accident in the planned interim storage, that could affect Austria, cannot be issued from.

The possibility of theft is extremely unlikely as a possible effect of conditioned waste of caused damages at greater distances is also negligible.

In principle, it is necessary to appreciate that JAVYS decided to store the waste with the lowest activity (VLLW - very low level radioactive waste) in the interim storage and not release it (e.g. for melting).

Additional technical measure that should be unconditionally accepted, is the proposal to mitigate the impact of operational events by filtration of exhaust air, which is discharged from the interim storage.

**Fulfilment:** *Fulfilment is described in chapter A II.8.2 „Technological solution“.*

## Statement of the organisation of GLOBAL 2000 (Stellungnahme Global 2000)

### 1. The text of the requirement

Alternatives are not sufficiently developed.

**Fulfilment:** *Performance is described in Chapter A II.9 „ alternatives of the proposed activity “ and C V. „Comparison of alternatives“*

### 2. The text of the requirement

Zero alternative is sufficiently described.



**Fulfilment:** *Performance is described in Chapter A II.9 „ alternatives of the proposed activity “ and C V. „ Comparison of alternatives “*

### **3. The text of the requirement**

Missing is the description of the consequences of possible failures, respectively accidents due to inadequate dimensioning (BDBA, Beyond Design-Base Accidents), in particular waste blowdown and penetration of radionuclides into groundwater, respectively in watercourses.

**Fulfilment:** *Incorporated in Chap. C III.19 Operational risks and their potential impact*

### **4. The text of the requirement**

Duration of storage and financing.

It is unclear how long the duration of the storage operation will take. What happens to the interim storage if after 70 years in Slovakia will not be erected the repository? For how long can the operation of integral storage be extended? How is the financing secured? How is today (until SE/ENEL exists) ensured, that e.g. in the future, shall the one causing this state, fund the restoration of all containers in all cases mentioned above, after 30 years, after 70 years or even for 100 years?

**Fulfilment:** *Incorporated in Chap. A II.8.7. Financing of the operation and decommissioning of IS of RAW.*

## **Comments from Hungary**

### **1. The text of the requirement**

**Waste with low and medium radioactivity waste with very low radioactivity must be placed so as to ensure the isolation of radioactive isotopes contained in the waste – which are dangerous to human, and potentially to environment – from the biosphere, as well as groundwater and surface water.** Such protection must be ensured at all times, until the intensity of radiation decreases below harmful value to human health and the environment, ensuring the protection of present and future generations and the environment.

**Fulfilment:** *The description of RAW storage is given in chapter A II.8 „ brief description of the technical and technological solutions “,in Part C III. are evaluated environmental impacts.*

### **2. The text of the requirement**

The planned storage of the radioactive waste is the surface building. The shortest distance from the border (air line between Bohunice and Dunakiliti) is 60 km. This distance is in terms of ground water large enough to provide protection in case of degradation of the insulation layers. Satisfactory answer to this question may provide a hydrodynamic modelling, which we believe **must be part of the EIA of the planned construction on the environment.**

**Fulfilment:** *groundwater monitoring is described in chapter VI. „ Proposed monitoring and post-project analysis “ and in chapter C II. 15.2 „ Water pollution“.*

### 3. The text of the requirement

**It is necessary to prevent the radioactive water from the decontamination, or other potentially radioactively contaminated water to get into the surface waters of the Danube basin.**

**Fulfilment:** *Incorporated in Chap. C II.15.2 „ Water pollution “ (a description of the control of the waters) and C III.5 „ Impacts on water conditions “.*

### 4. The text of the requirement

**Water discharged into canalisation, potentially radioactively contaminated water must be continuously monitored in order to determine the contamination and its location as soon as possible.**

**Fulfilment:** *Incorporated in Chap.C II. 15.2.2 „ Water pollution with radionuclides “ (a description of the control of discharges) a C III.5 „ Impacts on water conditions “.*

## Preparation for emergency incident

On the Hungarian part of the river Danube bank are filtered wells. In the event of a radiological accident, the contamination in a short time can get into wells, threatening the drinking water and thereby public water supplies. With regard to surface water, the potential contamination leakages from the storage of Bohunice would penetrate into the rivers Vah and after overcoming a distance of approximately 93 km reach the Danube. After its leakage into the Danube may constitute a potential danger for the bank filtered water resources along the banks of the Danube in the areas of Dunaalmás, Tát, Ostriho and Dömös.

### 5. The text of the requirement

**In order to effectively prevent from any possible accidents during the construction and operation of storage which might damage the surface waters in the Danube basin, it is necessary to develop an emergency plan.**

**Fulfilment:** *Incorporated in Chap. C II. 15 „ Characteristics of existing sources of pollution - noise, vibration, radiation, and their impact on the environment “ a v kap. VI. „ Proposed monitoring and post-project analysis “*

### 6. The text of the requirement

**Official informing of Hungarian authorities must be the part of the emergency plan in order to enable the operators of “by the bank filtered water sources” operated along the banks of Danube in potentially endangered geological environment, in case of contamination of the Danube, to prepare to take the necessary measures.**

**Fulfilment:**

*Incorporated in Chap. C III.5 „ Impacts on water conditions “ a C II.15.2 „ Water pollution’ “*

### **Monitoring Plan**

For radionuclides stored in interim storage or awaiting for disposal are particularly toxic and long-lived radioactive isotopes as follows:  $^{90}\text{Sr}$ ,  $^{129}\text{I}$ ,  $^{239}\text{Pu}$ ,  $^{137}\text{Cs}$ . **In event of an accident, these substances can get into the water ecosystem, so their effect will multiply and increase.**

#### **7. The text of the requirement**

We consider it important that not only that the insulating layer of radioactive waste storages shall meet all the requirements, but also to **monitor the standards and regulations conform to the European Union**, which in case of contamination, provided sufficient time to take effective action.

**Fulfilment:** *Incorporated in Chap. „ Proposed monitoring and post-project analysis “*

#### **8. The text of the requirement**

**We propose that under the now well-functioning exchange of radiological data, also the data from the above monitoring will be sent to the Hungarian side.**

**Fulfilment:** *This will be done in accordance with applicable legislation SR and international agreements*

### **Aspects of nature protection**

#### **9. The text of the requirement**

Within 50 km radius of the impact of the proposed „Interim storage of radioactive waste“ belong also the territories which are within the Danube-Ipeľ national park established by the Ministry of Environment and Regional Development no. 34/1997. (XI. 20.) on *Establishment of Danube Ipeľ national park* protected (and in part strictly protected) areas of national importance; also included are special areas approved by Government Resolution no. 275/2004. (X. 8.) on *protected natural areas of European importance* and of the Ministry of Environment and Water Management no. 14/2010. (V. 11.) on *protected nature areas of European importance* called Börzsöny and Vyšehradské hory (HUDI10002), Ipeľské údolie with specially protected birdlife (HUDI10008) and protected natural areas of particular importance Börzsöny (HUDI20008) and Ipeľské údolie (HUDI20026) (Natura 2000). Into the impact zone belongs the national ecological network stated in the appendix 3/1 of the Act XXVI/2003 National Land Use Plan and area of Ipeľského údolie, which has been legally declared XLII/1993 ***Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as biotopes of as Waterfowl Habitat, which was signed on 2 February 1971 in Ramsar and its amendments, adopted on 3 December 1982 and from 28 May 3rd June 1987.*** Please make sure that the study of the environmental impact also indicates the possible effects of the above sites.

**Fulfilment:** *This requirement applies to the location at Mochovce, which was not evaluated in the report because it is not considered to situate Interim storage of RAW at Mochovce site.*